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Recent Developments 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland unanimously 
held in Noble v. Bruce, 349 Md. 
730, 709 A.2d 1264 (1998), that an 
attorney is not liable to a testator's 
beneficiaries in a malpractice 
action for providing negligent 
estate planning advice to a testator 
or for negligently drafting a will. 
Rejecting the balancing-factors 
theory and the third-party 
beneficiary theory, the court relied 
upon the strict privity-rule, which 
states that an attorney is not liable 
to non-clients for negligence in the 
absence of privity or a duty to 
them. Consequently, beneficiaries 
will be unable to sue the testator's 
attorney for malpractice even if the 
attorney was negligent. 
The decision in Noble v. Bruce 
was the result of two consolidated 
cases: Noble v. Bruce and 
Fauntleroy v. Blizzard. In Noble, 
Mr. and Mrs. Long retained 
Charles A. Bruce, Jr. ("Bruce") to 
prepare their wills. Bruce prepared 
reciprocal wills for the Longs, who 
had substantial assets. The wills 
did not provide for a "by-pass" 
trust, which would have enabled 
the Longs to shelter 1.2 million 
dollars from federal estate taxes. 
After .Mr. and Mrs. Long died, 
the beneficiaries of the Longs' 
estates sued Bruce in the Circuit 
Court for Somerset County 
alleging that he was negligent in 
failing to provide tax-planning 
advice to the Longs. Bruce 
asserted in an affidavit that he did 
inform the Longs of the tax 
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implications, but that the Longs 
did not wish to part with control of 
their assets during their lifetimes. 
Bruce filed a motion for summary 
judgment, which was granted by 
the circuit court. The Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland 
affirmed, stating that the 
beneficiaries lacked standing to 
sue Bruce. The beneficiaries 
appealed to the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland. 
In Fauntleroy, Ms. Jackson, 
the testator, retained T. Houghlett 
Henry, Jr. ("Henry") to prepare her 
will. Ms. Jackson bequeathed 
stock in Pittsburgh Des Moines 
Steel Company ("PDM") to the 
children and grandchildren of her 
brother-in-law. The will directed 
that all taxes were to be paid out of 
the residuary estate. Henry 
subsequently sent Ms. Jackson a 
letter stating that the PDM stock 
would pay its own taxes as they 
discussed. At her death in 1994, 
Ms. Jackson owned, in addition to 
other property, 1.4 million dollars 
worth ofPDM stock, and the estate 
and inheritance taxes totaled 
$910,000. In accordance with the 
provisions of the will, the taxes 
were borne by the residuary 
legatees, the Fauntleroys. 
The Fauntleroys brought suit in 
the Circuit Court for Talbot 
County against Henry's estate 
alleging that Henry was negligent 
in preparing the will, specifically, 
in providing that the taxes were to 
be paid from the residuary estate 
instead of from the proceeds of the 
sale of the stock. Henry's estate 
filed a motion to dismiss, which 
was granted because the 
beneficiaries lacked standing to 
sue. The Fauntleroys appf(aled to 
the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland and filed a petition for 
writ of certiorari to the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland, which was 
granted. 
In these consolidated cases, the 
issue before the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland was whether an 
attorney is liable in a malpractice 
action to non-client, third parties 
for providing negligent estate 
planning advice or for negligently 
drafting a will. Noble, 349 Md. at 
733, 709 A.2d at 1266. In 
reaching its decision, the court 
evaluated three approaches applied 
in attorney malpractice actions for 
negligent estate planning: the 
balancing-factors theory; the third-
party beneficiary theory; and the 
strict-privity rule. Id at 738, 709 
A.2d at 1268. 
Under the balancing-factors 
theory, the court considered "'the 
extent to which the transaction was 
intended to affect the plaintiff, the 
foreseeability of harm to him, the 
degree of certainty that the 
plaintiff suffered mJury, the 
closeness of the connection 
between the defendant's conduct 
and the injury, and the policy of 
preventing future harm. '" Id. at 
743, 709 A.2d at 1271 (quoting 
Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685,687 
(Cal. 1961)). The court dismissed 
the balancing-factors theory as 
overly broad and unworkable. Id. 
at 744, 709 A.2d at 127l. 
N ext, the court discussed the 
third-party beneficiary theory. 
This theory is premised upon the 
existence of a duty between the 
attorney and the non-client. Id. at 
746, 709 A.2d at 1272 (citing 
Flaherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md. 
116, 134, 492 A.2d 618, 627 
(1985)). An attorney will owe a 
duty to the non-client if, as a direct 
result of the transaction, the client 
intended to benefit the non-client. 
Id at 747, 709 A.2d at 1272. 
(quoting Flaherty, 303 Md. at 
130-31, 492 A.2d at 625). 
Therefore, once the non-client 
establishes that the attorney owed 
him a duty, he must prove the 
remaining elements of negligence. 
Id at 747, 709 A.2d at 1273 (citing 
Flaherty, 303 Md. at 131, 492 
A.2d at 625). 
The court rejected the third-
party beneficiary theory, 
articulating several reasons why 
the third-party beneficiary theory 
did not apply in these cases. First, 
neither' attorney was retained by 
the testators to provide estate-
planning advice on behalf of the 
beneficiaries. Id at 752-53, 709 
A.2d at 1276. Second, the client's 
intent to benefit the non-client 
must be a direct purpose of the 
transaction or relationship. Id. at 
754, 709 A.2d at 1276. The 
beneficiary of the will is not 
necessarily the beneficiary of the 
attorney-client relationship. Id. In 
the cases before the court, the 
testators intended to benefit 
themselves in planning their 
estates by retaining Bruce and 
Henry. Id. As a result, the 
beneficiaries of the wills were not 
third-party beneficiaries. Id. 
The court further noted that 
Maryland courts generally apply 
the strict-privity test in attorney 
malpractice cases. Id. at 738, 709 
A.2d at 1268 (citing Wlodarek v. 
Thrift, 178 Md. 453,468, 13 A.2d 
774, 481 (1940)). The court 
followed the rule of Nat 'I Savings 
Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 205-
06 (1879), which held that a party 
not in privity with the attorney 
may not maintain a negligence 
action against the attorney. Noble, 
349 Md. at 738, 709 A.2d at 1268. 
To maintain a cause of action for 
negligence or malpractice against 
an attorney, the plaintiff must 
prove the following: "1) the 
attorney's employment; 2) his 
neglect of a reasonable duty; and 
3) loss to the client proximately 
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caused by the neglect of duty." Id. 
at 739, 709 A.2d at 1269 (citing 
Kendall v. Rogers, 181 Md. 606, 
611-12,31 A.2d 312,315 (1943)). 
Thus, in the absence of a duty 
between the attorney and the third 
party, the third party may not 
maintain a negligence claim 
against the attorney. Id. (quoting 
Flaherty, 303 Md. at 134, 492 
A.2d at 627). 
To determine if a duty exists, 
the court will consider the 
relationship between the parties 
and the nature of the harm that 
could result from the lack of 
ordinary care. Id. (quoting 
Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank, 307 
Md. 527, 534-35, 515 A.2d 756, 
759-60 (1986)). Courts generally 
will find that no duty exists where 
the harm is purely economic and 
no privity exists between the 
parties. Id. at 740, 709 A.2d 1269 
(citing Jacques, 309 Md. at 537, 
515 A.2d at 761). 
The court noted that public 
policy, such as the duty of loyalty 
to the client, conflict of interest 
between the testator and the 
beneficiaries, and unlimited 
liability to third parties justifies the 
strict-privity rule. Id. at 741-42, 
709 A.2d at 1270. Thus, the 
attorney-client relationship will 
sustain an undue burden if a rule 
other than the strict-privity rule 
was adopted. Id. at 742, 709 A.2d 
at 1270. The court held that the 
strict-privity rule applies in this 
case; consequently, the 
beneficiaries can not maintain a 
cause of action against the 
attorneys because no employment 
relationship existed between the 
29.1 U. BaIt. L.F. 65 
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attorneys and the beneficiaries. Id. 
at 752, 709 A.2d at 1275. 
In Noble v. Bruce, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland held that a 
third party not in privity with the 
attorney may not maintain a legal 
malpractice action against the 
attorney. With the adoption ofthe 
strict-privity rule in attorney 
malpractice actions, the court of 
appeals adopted a bright-line test, 
which effectively denies a cause of 
action to all beneficiaries who the 
attorney did not represent. The 
adoption of such a bright-line test 
is unquestionably harsh to the 
innocent beneficiaries because the 
testator almost certainly intended 
to benefit these individuals. The 
faulty drafting of a will or the 
negligent planning advice given to 
a testator could indeed deprive the 
beneficiaries of what the testator 
intended for them to have. Yet, 
the beneficiaries are seemingly 
without recourse. The court, 
however, did not foreclose the 
possibility that the testator's estate 
may stand in the shoes of the 
testator and meet the strict-privity 
test. Thus, the testator or the 
testator's estate might have a cause 
of action against the attorney for 
negligence, but damages may be 
limited to attorney's fees. 
Regardless of the apparent 
harshness of this rule, a bright-line 
test is nonetheless necessary for 
several reasons. First, without a 
bright-line test, disgruntled 
beneficiaries will bring a flood of 
litigation. Second, all parties to a 
transaction will know that unless 
an employment relationship exists, 
non-clients cannot maintain a 
29.1 U. Bait. L.F. 66 
cause of action for professional 
malpractice. Third, the strict-
privity test protects the attorney-
client relationship by ensuring that 
the attorney will act with complete 
loyalty to his client. The 
attorney's attention will thus be 
directed fully to the needs of his 
client and he will not have to 
balance the needs of the 
beneficiaries or fear liability from 
third parties. Fourth, a lawyer can 
represent his client zealously 
without having to fear a conflict of 
interest between his client and the 
beneficiaries. Finally, the strict-
privity rule ensures that when the 
lawyer undertakes to represent a 
client, the lawyer will know 
exactly to whom potential liability 
could extend. 
